Box 2, Folder 14 – Department of Defense

 

February 18, 1971, Symposium at Fort Rucker, AL. It is not clear who the audience was, probably officers in the Armed Forces.

 

2/18/71, Typewritten text of Packard’s talk. Written in outline format.

Saying that he has now been on the job for two years and two months, Packard says that, “In addition to dealing with day-to-day problems, we have had some opportunity to look down the road – Force Planning, based on Nixon Doctrine – President’s statement on future U. S. foreign policy.

 

Force planning based on realities:

 

1. Build-up of  Soviet strategic forces – conventional forces more important.
2. NATO-Warsaw pact is not only potential area of conflict:

 

Middle-East

Asia

Probably not South America and Africa south of Sahara

1. Fiscal realities – human programs; no tax increase
2. Domestic political realities – zero draft; manpower limit

 

Conventional forces of US and allies must be designed to provide credible deterrent. Guidelines for future forces:

 

1. Maintain credible nuclear deterrent non-nuclear force

 

1. with friends and allies
2. with lower manpower levels
3. at about present budget level

(1)     continuing rise in manpower cost:

53% of budget

2.5M cost 13B – 1964

2.5M cost 29B – 1972

We must do a better job in applying technology to conventional tactical warfare. We must find more effective, more efficient, ways to develop and procure military hardware.

 

Both requirements dictate better decisions on what to develop – the issue you have been discussing here.

Some lessons have been learned in Vietnam and some others – very important lessons – were learned during the middle east crisis last year.

 

Unfortunately, the Defense Department system has a very poor ability to learn anything – even the obvious.

 

One has to only look at two things – photographs of areas bombed in Vietnam and expenditures made over the last few years for conventional ordnance expended there – to conclude our so-called air power – particularly interdiction – has been very ineffective – disgracefully so. I am pleased to report that very substantial improvements have been achieved during the past two years – gunships, guided weapons, and improved tactics.

 

We have begun to see what can be done – and the key point is that substantial improvements in effectiveness can be achieved with substantially lower costs both in dollars and in lives.

 

Sensors – better night vision – better range finders – better ordinance – all have given our ground forces greatly increased capability over what they had five years ago.

 

I know you have been discussing some of these things at this conference.

 

I am greatly troubled that what gains as have been made – in spite of system, DCPG – sensor, etc.

 

Not all good – speed-cost, gunships – small group, system – two years, back to small group – 6 months.

 

We are entering an exciting era in the things you are discussing here.

 

New imagination – what to do – get out into real world – fort Hood – operational jesting – development needs to be coupled better with requirements.

 

Service staff – wrong way – get the development people out with operational people -–tell the paper shufflers to go home.

 

We are going to try some new approaches, DCPG – Defense Special Projects Group, DSPG.

 

We are setting up new group for tactical communications, Tri Tac. Battle short around system.

 

More reliance on hardware, less paper.

 

New aircraft designs – new weapon system concept, no total package procurement.

 

Good old fashioned approach. Design it before you produce it.

 

Cost incentive contracts for development – fixed price – hold to it.

 

Better management – Services.

 

The future

 

Smaller forces – if credible deterrence must be more effective. Must get more for defense dollar – need your help – it won’t be done in the Pentagon. Want to be done by Service staff people – must be done at working level.

 

 

Box 2, Folder 15 – Department of Defense

 

March 3, 1971, Council on Foreign Relations

 

3/3/71, Typewritten text , in outline format, of Packard’s talk.

 

1. Immediately after taking office in 1969 extensive reviews were undertaken by the Nixon Administration to reorient United States foreign Policy for the 1970s.

 

A   A changed  — and changing – world environment.

1. Frustration with role in Vietnam.
2. Need for more federal resources to help solve domestic problems.

 

(1)     Changes in free world

(2)     Changes in communist world

 

1.  Studies under Security Council machinery and real issues – Vietnam, Mid-East, Korea, SALT

 

2.  President Nixon’s statement in Guam in the summer of 1969 and his November  1969 address to the nation laid out elements of new partnership.

 

1. U.S. will keep all treaty commitments.
2. U.S. shall provide shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or one whose survival we consider vital to our security
3. In cases involving other type of aggression we will provide military and economic assistance but look to nation threatened to provide manpower for its defense.

 

3. The President’s statement on U.S. foreign policy for the 1970s released last week reflects these realities.

 

1. A major American role in the world remains indispensable.

 

Middle East – NATO – Asia

1. Other nation can and should assume a greater responsibility for their sake as well as ours.

 

1. The change in the strategic relationship calls for new approaches – new doctrines. Parity – more reliance on non-nuclear.

 

1. Changes in the communist world present different challenges and new opportunities. Sino/Soviet conflict – real. Keep open communication Soviets – open China.

 

1.  Defense planning has been undertaken since 1969 to be consistent with this evolving policy for the 1970s

 

1. To implement the Nixon Doctrine.
2. To accommodate a reordering of  federal resource priorities – larger share for human needs – smaller share for defense needs.

 

1.  Some problems in implementing a defense program to meet these objectives.

 

A. Growing Soviet military strength – strategic nuclear – naval forces in particular.

 

1.  Increased cost of military manpower, e. g. 1972 = 185% of 1964 for military pay vs. 125% for goods and services. 2.5 million military force cost $13B in 1964 but $29B in 1971.  All volunteer force.

 

1. All allies are stronger but traditional reliance on U.S. difficult to change.

 

1. During these past two years we have taken some important steps to implement the Nixon Doctrine.

 

1. Vietnam – 549,000 U.S. troops in 1968 – 330,000 now and 284,000 May 1, 1971. ARVN forces now carry major combat role there.
2. South Korea – 20,000 fewer U.S. troops – more equipment aid for ROK.
3. Reductions – 12,000 in Japan, 5,000 in Okinawa, 16,000 in Thailand, 9,000 in Philippines – worldwide government personnel reductions – 86,000 people.
4. The Nixon Doctrine calls for Fewer people but more aid — MAP supplemental of $1B approved closing days of 1970.
5. Defense budget has gone from 9.5% of GNP in 1968 to a projected 7.8% for FY 72 – from 42.5% of federal budget to 31.6%
6. People adjustments have been substantial

 

Military

Civilian

Defense Related

Total

 

Defense budget lower force levels

Higher R & D

More readiness

A budget realistic deterrence

 

1. The most important test of the Nixon Doctrine is in southeast Asia.

 

1. Early in 1969 it appeared that negotiations were not a likely route to an acceptable solution in VN
2. Vietnamization emphasized. Military progress excellent – million man VDN forces – capability demonstrated in Cambodia. Some problems which will take a little more time – will be solved. We are close to time when no U.S. forces needed – won’t withdraw until POW issue solved.

 

1. Southeast Asia,  Vietnamization was a new policy begun in spring of 1969.

 

1. Planning – how to get U.S. forces out in six months
2. SVN handle situation if NVN left country

 

Idea was feasible – it should support negotiations – alternate if negotiations failed.

Leadership and training

Logistic capability – supply – repair

Communications

Intelligence

Tactical Air – B-52d, Laos interdiction, air defense

Naval – Riverine –coastal

Much progress made – Fall ’69 visit

New capability – fight enemy

Supplies and sanctuaries – Cambodia & Laos

Supplies through Sianoukville

Cambodian operation

Over 20,000 tons – PRC – successful

Cut supplies

Lowered casualties

Cambodian response

Nationalistic Spirit

30,000 to 200,000

Fair capability – improving

Changed enemy tactics

Small unit operations

Terror remains high

Harassment in Cambodia

Isolate Phnom Penh

ARVN forces very effective

Beginning of dry season

Major supply effort through Laos

If successful, support activities in SVN and Cambodia

Possible to move on ground to disrupt supply movement in Laos

Increased ARVN capability

Low activity in south

Expected tough fight – North bad to respond –(contrast    Cambodia)

Already some success – 900,000 # rice

Will require two or three weeks more to get clear picture.

Vietnamization already clearly successful – military

Economic – time business friends go look

Political

Withdrawal of U.S. troops continue

Prisoner of Wear problem

Negotiations bring end

Guerrilla fighting continue

Fighting just fade down

 

1. What does the future hold for the Nixon Doctrine

 

Partnership

Strength

Negotiation

 

Partnership – friends and allies not only carry larger share of burden – but have larger voice in determining the best approach to their own problems.

 

Strength – the realities of the world dictate that U.S. leadership must be backed by strength – not only U.S. strength but strength of our friends and allies.

 

1. Vietnam must be strong enough to handle its own problems
2. The strength of Jordan in handling Fedayeen problem a good example

 

We must negotiate from a position of strength – SALT – Mideast

 

A look ahead shows us on a difficult course. We are embarked on that course and are making progress. If we can move ahead with a sense of unity and a sense of purpose, I am convinced we can indeed reach the President’s goal – a generation in peace.

 

 

Box 2, Folder 16 – Department of Defense

 

March 24, 1971, The Department of Defense in a Generation of Peace, IEEE Convention and Exposition, New York City

3/24/71, Typewritten text of Packard’s speech, includes handwritten notations by him.

 

Packard apologizes for a “bit of nostalgia” and notes that, up until he joined the Department of Defense in 1969 he had attended the IEE annual Convention every year since 1940. He says these three decades have been “the center of action” – “exiting and expansive times for the electronic profession.” He adds that “They were exciting and expansive times for me, too.”

 

Packard says that prior to World War II, electronics “was radio and communications.”  In these early days the industry was not “highly dependent upon national defense funds to support its research, or to keep its factories going.” But, “As weapons production built up in 1941 in response to the war in Europe and the Pacific, defense requirements became a substantial factor in the electronics industry.”

 

“There was no better place to observe – as well as to be a part of – this great drama of electronics as it unfolded over these past three decades than to have been here, year after year, at this Annual IEEE Convention and Show.”

 

“During those exciting years there was no nonsense about basic research having to be directly related – in an immediately obvious, provable way – to known military requirements. If Defense experts thought it was good research, it was supported.

 

“Independent research and development was viewed as an essential element of progress, and it was recognized that new knowledge would flow from such research to the benefit of society at large and that it then would support the nation’s defense effort indirectly, if not directly.”

 

“A few years ago” Packard says, “a changing attitude began to develop in this country toward Defense-supported research. In fact, the attitude began to change in respect to all research.

 

“Underlying this change  was the realization that the products of science are not always purely beneficial to mankind; that more wisdom and more judgment should enter into the decisions about how science should be applied to the needs and problems of the world. Disillusionment and concern about the Vietnam war was certainly a factor in these changing attitudes.

 

“Many people at all levels of government and science have come to believe during these past few years that it is time to think through again some of our past axioms. One sees evidence that this is happening by looking at this convention’s program. I see more broad philosophical issues being addressed in the papers presented here this week than was the case ten years ago.”

 

“The Defense Department has had a very important and, I believe, constructive role in this rethinking, rededication, and revitalization.”

 

“President Nixon does not intend for the United States to back away from its role of world leadership. We do intend to exercise our power for peace. I find myself troubled, however, because our vision is too often blurred by domestic bickering and by partisan politics in matters related to world affairs. Apparently, this is nothing new, however. DeTocqueville stated the case very well in a special reference to the United States 140 years ago.” Packard reads this 1830 quote from DeTocqueville:

 

‘Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those qualities which are peculiar to a democracy. They require, on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all those in which it is deficient. A democracy can only with great difficulties regulate the details of an important undertaking, persevere in a fixed design and work out its execution in spite of serious obstacles. It cannot combine its measures with secrecy or avert their consequences  with patience.’

 

Packard refers to President Nixon’s statement regarding a new course for United States leadership: ’No goal could be greater than to make the next generation the first in this century in which America is at peace with every nation in the world.’

 

Packard says that, since he and Secretary Laird came to the Depart of Defense in the spring of 1969, “…we have been working hard on a reassessment of our military commitments and our military forces against the background of a changed –and still changing –world. We want to be sure our future forces will provide the Realistic Deterrence necessary for a generation of peace.”

 

Packard talks about trying to balance the goal of providing this deterrence, against such problems as the continuing frustration over the unresolved situation in Southeast Asia, large Federal deficits, and increasing defense spending. “I sincerely believe”, he says, [ that in planning our nation’s military forces we have recognized] “the realistic need and desire of our nation’s people to have a larger share of federal resources applied to domestic problems and programs.”

 

“We are winding down U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia.”

 

“In 1968 the Defense budget was 9 ½  percent of the gross national product. For the fiscal year beginning next July it will be down to 6.8 percent of the gross national product.”

 

“The additional $23 billion which would be required in 1972 to support forces at the level they were in 1968 has been applied to domestic programs”

 

“…it is not an easy task to be sure we can have adequate capability at lower force levels.

 

“During the past few years, the soviets have been building up their nuclear forces. They now have forces equal to ours, and their build-up is continuing. They are building a navy capable of world-wide operations, and they continue to improve their tactical nuclear and conventional ground force capability on the Warsaw Pact front. The Communist Chinese are continuing to develop their nuclear weapons and missiles to deliver  them. They, too, are building submarines and naval forces, and they maintain large armies with modern weapons. There is no evident reduction of subversion, terrorism, or violence anywhere in the world.

 

“In the face of these challenges, our Defense task is to develop and to support United States military capability adequate to deter the use of these forces by those countries that have them. We recognize we must do this with lower manpower levels and reasonable budgets in the future.”

 

“We have some favorable factors on our side, Our friends and allies around the world have increasing military capability backed by increasing economic strength. This is true in Korea and Indo-China, in Taiwan and Japan. Our NATO allies recognize they should do more, and they have the wherewithall to do more.

 

“There are hopeful developments in the Middle East – hope for a successful negotiation supported and sustained subsequently by adequate deterrent strength.”

 

“The essential requirement toward achieving Realistic Deterrence with lower forces is that we focus on capabilities rather than on mere units of forces.

 

“It is very clear that there is much support and historical precedent for great attention on numbers of ships, airplanes, and divisions. It is equally clear that we easily can be misled into the mistaken assumption that these numbers alone contain useful information about capabilities.”

 

“Better application of technology, new and old, can enhance the capability of our military forces – land, sea, and air. That is why we are requesting in the Fiscal 72 Budget increased finds for Research and Development. I am referring here to a real increase, not just enough to overcome inflation, but enough to really increase our Research and Development over the level of effort of the past two years.

 

“If approved, this real increase in the R&D budget will impact directly on the members of this society and this industry. The increase reflects both the end of transition budgets and a conscious decision to return to this nation’s greatest source of relative strength – technology – to provide forces for Realistic Deterrence at realistic budget levels.

 

“It is my honest opinion that if we are to maintain forces that ensure Realistic Deterrence with lower budget levels and fewer men and women in uniform then the most important contribution we can make toward better capability is to increase the effectiveness of our DEFENSE research and Development program. That’s the message I bring you tonight. And, I believe congress will support this emphasis on Research and Development because I believe they will agree that this country simply cannot afford to risk the future security of our people to both lower forces and inferior weapons.”

 

“I do not know how many of you here tonight are interested in doing Research and Development for the defense Department in the future. I hope you have not all been misled into believing that the only fields worthy of scientific and intellectual effort are health and environment. I hope some of you are still willing to work on national security problems. I want to tell you – we need you; your nation needs you. And we need your best efforts and new initiative now.

 

“Let’s all understand that if Congress approves my request for increased research and development funding in FY 1972, it has a binding commitment from me – a personal pledge – that research and development programs will be better managed in the future than they have been in the past.

 

“If you tell us you can develop a new system for national defense, we will expect you to build it, test it, and prove to us that it works; and we will expect that before we buy production quantities.

 

“Gentlemen, there is going to be no more brochure engineering. We want hardware that works – not paper that claims it’s going to work. And working hardware is what I’m going to get – hardware that increases the capabilities of our smaller forces.

 

“There are, in fact, some very important and exciting jobs to be done. We are going to encourage those new initiatives. We are going to place more dependence on technology in the future. We are going to defend this greatest, freest nation in history. And with your help, she will remain free.”

 

3/24/71, Copy of  Press Release issued by the Department of Defense containing full text of Packard’s speech.

3/24/71, Copy of IEEE 71 Annual Banquet program

11/2/70,  Copy of letter to Packard from Emmet G. Cameron, IEEE, inviting him to speak at the International Exposition and Conference banquet in New York on March 24, 1971.

11/7/70, Copy of memorandum to Packard from Daniel Z Henkin, Assistant Secretary of Defense, recommending that Packard to accept IEEE’s invitation.

11/12/70, Copy of letter to Emmet G. Cameron, IEEE, from Julian R. Levine, Assistant Secretary of Defense, accepting, on behalf of Packard,  the invitation to speak on 3/24/71.

2/9/71, Letter to Packard from Emmet G. Cameron of IEEE giving details on the dinner arrangements.

2/19/71, Copy of letter to Emmet G. Cameron, IEEE,  from Packard confirming his attendance at the 3/24/71 event.

2/23/71, Copy of letter to J. H. Schumacher from Margaret Paull, Packard’s secretary, discussing hotel arrangements.

Undated, Schedule of day of 3/24/71

3/29/71, Letter to Packard from Thomas H. O’Brien saying he enjoyed Packard’s speech.

Undated,  Two Flyers from a local anti-military group attacking Packard personally.

 

 

Box 2, Folder 17 – Department of Defense

 

April 8, 1971, WEMA, San Francisco, CA

 

4/8/71, Copy of transcription of speech

 

Referring rather jokingly to recent dissent activities [and the fact that this speech was moved from Palo Alto to San Francisco by the DOD for security reasons] Packard says “I can tell you in all sincerity that the Department of Defense has made considerable progress during these past two and a half years under the leadership of my good friend Mel Laird.” And he says he wants to talk about three areas in particular where he believes some contributions have been made.

 

”The first is in the realm of international policy.

 

“Second, is in the reorder of the priorities of the Federal government.

 

“And the third is the changes that we have made in the management of the Department of Defense.

 

Saying that President Nixon “has set our country on a new course in foreign policy for the decade of the 1970s,” Packard refers to the President’s statement by saying  “no goal could be greater than to make the next generation the first in this country in which America has been at peace with every nation of the world. This has been a major transition in our national policy and in our foreign policy, and the Defense Department has had a substantial role in the development of this new foreign policy.”

 

Packard says “It is our objective to move this country from an era of confrontation into an era of negotiation.” And he cites examples where negotiation has been taking place: with the Soviet Union on arms limitation, with the North Vietnamese trying to solve the problems in Southeast Asia, in the Middle East, and with China.

 

“In addition to negotiations, there are two other pillars to this Nixon Doctrine, the pillar of partnership and the pillar of strength.

 

“And as the President has explained, the central thesis of the Nixon Doctrine, is that the United States will participate in the necessary defense and support of our allies and friends; that America cannot and will not conceive all of the plans, design all of the programs, execute all of the decisions, pay all of the bills, provide all of the manpower, and undertake all of the defense for the Free nations of the world.”

 

Packard says there are three elements to the Nixon Doctrine:

 

“The United States will keep all of its treaty commitments.

 

“Second, we will provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or a nation whose survival we consider vital to our own security.

 

“And third, in the case of non-nuclear aggression, we will furnish such military and economic assistance as is required and as is appropriate.

 

“Vietnamization is the first major application of the Nixon Doctrine, and I am particularly proud of our Vietnamization program, because it was Secretary Laird and I, I believe, who first recognized in the spring of 1969, that it was very unlikely that there could be any profitable, substantial, effective results from the Paris negotiations, short of turning all of Southeast Asia over to the Communists, and, that indeed, a different solution had to be found to that problem.”

 

Packard gives some statistics showing the reduction of forces in Vietnam: “In 1969, the United States had an authorized military strength of 549,000 in South Vietnam….In May of this year, less than a month from now, the authorized strength will be down to 284,000. By Christmas of this year, we will be down to 180,000…”

 

Packard adds the thought that “This war will end not when the United States forces go home. This war will end when the North Vietnamese forces go home.”

 

“But as we emphasize partnership and negotiation in implementing this Nixon Doctrine, we must maintain a sufficient military strength of our own United States military forces. We cannot overlook the fact that the Soviets, the Chinese, in fact all aggressor nations and potential aggressor nations, respect strength.”

 

Packard tells of lessons learned in dealing with the “Jordan crises last fall.”

 

“First, it is important for the United States to have armed forces ready for unexpected developments.

 

“Second, the Soviet Navy is a growing threat to our ability to support our friends in the Mideast.

 

“Third, a very serious development was avoided primarily because Jordan had the military strength to solve her own problems. This stemmed in a large part from past American help.

 

“And, fourth, the existence of allies and friends in an area is crucial if the United States is to cope with a crisis in that area.”

 

“Now in reorienting our defense programs to support the Nixon Doctrine these past two and a quarter years, we have also been able to bring about a very substantial reordering of the Federal priorities. As you in this audience sell know, we are spending less on defense. No one wants to give us much credit for helping provide for more—for non-defense domestic programs, but that is in fact what we have done.

 

“In 1969, the Defense budget was nine and one-half per cent of the Gross National Product. In 1972, it will be 6.8 per cent of the Gross National product. This is the lowest it has been since 1951 when it was 6.7 per cent of the Gross national Product.

 

“The reallocation of resources within the Federal budget has brought defense down to 32 per cent for fiscal 1972. It averaged 51.4 per cent in the decade of the 50s, 32.4 per cent in the decade of the 60s, and I am confident that we can provide this country the military strength to support the Nixon Doctrine with an average of less than 30 per cent of the Federal budget in the decade of the 70s.

 

“The non-defense programs of this country received less than 50 per cent of the Federal budget in the decade of the 50s, less than 50 per cent of the Federal budget in the decade of the 60s, but will average more than 70 per cent of the Federal budget in the decade of the 70s.

 

“Now let me outline for you some of the problems we have in planning our military forces with adequate strength to support the Nixon doctrine for the decade of the 70s. To hopefully achieve this generation of peace we must have the strength to deter war; we must have strength adequate for a realistic deterrent. This must include our strategic nuclear forces as well as our conventional forces.

 

“Let me cite some of the problems we have, and some of the figures:

 

“In 1968, Defense outlays were $78 billion. In that year there were 4.8 million men and women on the payrolls of the Defense Department, military and civilian. In 1972 Defense Department outlays will be $76 billion. This $76 billion, however, will support only three and one-half million military men. To put it another way, it would cost us in 1972, $23 billion more than we plan to spend if we were to support the forces we had in 1968.”

 

“A part of our problem has been inflation, as I am sure you know. But our problem is primarily one of military pay. We have been asking the young men of our country to not only devote two years of their life to military services when they are drafted but we have been asking them also to make a very substantial financial contribution. It depends a little bit on the service and on the number of dependents and so forth, but as a ball park figure, pay and allowances for people who go into the service, first year, second year, amounts to about $2500 a year. We train young people to go into the New York police force and get $9,000 a year; they can go into other areas and get comparable amounts. So, in effect, we have been asking our young people in this country to contribute two years of their life in uniform and probably at least $10,000 in terms of their potential enemy [should be earnings].”

 

Packard says they are trying to correct this situation. He shows how military pay is rising faster than inflation.

 

“We have already said we will have in 1972, about three and a half-million people altogether on DOD payrolls, military and civilian. In 1964, there were about the same…actually 3.6 million. Pay and related costs for these 3.6 million people in 1964 were $22 billion. Pay and related costs for three and a half million people in 1972 will be $39 billion, almost twice as much.“

 

“So it is not an easy task to be sure that we can have the necessary military strength to support the Nixon doctrine with the budget levels I have suggested. It is not clear that we are going to be able to have the adequate capability at lower force levels, although, as I will now try and outline for you, I am convinced myself that this can be done.”

 

“But,” Packard says, “we have some problems to face.” And he describes the military buildup of both the Soviets and the Chinese.

 

“In the face of these challenges our defense task then is to develop and support the forces that will have the military capability adequate to deter the use of the forces by those countries that have them. We must recognize that this will have to be done with lower manpower levels and reasonable budgets in the future. Now the important word here is capability. Now a deterrence can be realistic only if our forces have capability.”

 

Even though “Our friends and allies around the world have increasing military capability, backed by increasing economic strength….Nevertheless, our Nation’s defense programs place before us some very demanding tasks “

 

“The essential requirement toward achieving realistic deterrence with lower military forces, is that we focus on the capabilities of these forces rather than on more units of forces.”

 

“As an example, we can be concerned about the number of our tactical air squadrons and make assumptions about their capabilities to the foreign missions. We could double the numbers of our airplanes at costs of billions of dollars, and thus, increase the capabilities, at least on paper.

“But we have elected instead, and we are going to provide improved weapons for our aircraft, and we believe by doing this, we can improve the capability of our forces by factors of 3 and 4, with only modest increases in expenditures.”

 

“There are, I am convinced, many, many things we can do to substantially improve the capability of our forces, things that we have not done effectively in the past, and I am confident that by applying a better—making a better application of our technology to our military problems,  that this job can be done. And that is why we are requesting in Fiscal 1972 budget, increased funds for research and development. And I am referring here to a real increase, not just enough to overcome inflation but enough to really increase our research and development over the level of effort over the past two years.

 

“If approved, this real increase in R&D can, of course, impact directly on the members of this industry. This increase reflects both the end of transition budgets and a constant decision to return to this Nation’s source of relative strength, its technology to provide forces for the realistic deterrents we need for the decade of the 70s at realistic budget levels.”

 

Packard gives some specific objectives in their 1972 budget.

 

“We are requesting $7.8 billion in the 72 budget [compared to $7 billion in the 71 budget]. We have a budget request based—focused on three significant areas. One is to make sure that we can maintain an adequate level of basic research in the military areas so that there will be no surprises, so that we are not likely to encounter a military sputnik over the years ahead.

 

“Second, we are requesting the Congress to address the question of funding the important research and development programs to make sure that they are funded so that they can be managed efficiently. And funding has been a problem in many ways. If you go back and change the funding of the programming every year it is impossible to have that program managed in an efficient way.

 

“And third, and perhaps most important, we are trying to place new emphasis on areas which hopefully can give us a quantum jump in our capability. New initiatives, as we call them. Some of these are already underway, but many of them are considered to be too expensive. The services would rather have a thousand 500-pound bombs than one weapon that would really do the job that might cost $200,000 or something like that. And we finally, I think, are getting our military people to come around to recognize these facts.

 

“It is my honest opinion that if we are to maintain forces that will insure the realistic deterrents at lower budget levels, the most important contribution we can make toward better capability is to increase the effectiveness of our defense research and development program.

 

“That is the message I bring to you here tonight, and I believe the Congress will support this emphasis on research and development because I believe they will agree that this country simply cannot afford to take the risks to the security of our people and to our position in world leadership with both lower forces and inferior weapons.

 

“Now whether an increase now in research and development for defense will bring back the good old days to your profession and to your industry, I cannot predict. I do not know how many of you here tonight are interested in doing research and development for the Defense Department in the future. I hope you have not all been misled into believing that the only field worthy of scientific and intellectual effort are health and environment. I hope some of you are still willing to work on national security problems. I want to tell you, we need you. Your Nation needs you, and we need your best efforts and your new initiatives now.

 

“And let us all understand that if the Congress includes my request for increased research and development funding for 1972, it has a binding commitment from me, a personal commitment, that research and development programs in the future will be better managed than they have been in the past.

 

“If you tell us you can develop a new system for national defense, we will expect you to build it, test it, and prove to us that it works, and we will expect that before we buy production quantities.

 

“Gentlemen, there is going to be less of this brochure engineering than there has been in the past. We want hardware that works, and not paper that claims it is going to work. And working hardware is what we are going to get, hardware that will increase the capability of our smaller forces.

 

“There are in fact some very important and exciting jobs to be done, and I have been very encouraged as I travel around the country and see some of the things that we are doing. It is a tremendously thrilling thing to see the enthusiasm and capability that we have in this area. We are going to place more dependence on technology in the future, and we are going to defend this greatest free nation in the history, and with your help, she will remain free.

 

“It has been a great honor and a pleasure for me to be with you here tonight. As I said in the beginning, I think it is a little unfortunate that here the leaders of the industry in this area are unwilling to stand up to that bunch of radicals down the peninsula. I just want to remind all of you that they want to destroy everything our country stands for, what you and I have been working together these past three decades to achieve. The Dave Harrises, the Jane Fondas, and all of those who support them, I want to remind you are your deadly enemies. They want to destroy you as well as me. Don’t let them do it.” [Notation in transcript: – Standing ovation]

 

1/4/71, Letter to Packard from R. L. Conlisk, WEMA, discussing details of the forthcoming WEMA banquet.

1/25/71, Letter to Packard from James N. Donovan, Varian, saying he is delighted Packard will be speaking.

3/25/71, Letter to Packard from Ed Ferry, WEMA, discussing the banquet and the audience. A copy of the program is attached.

4/16/71,  Letter to Packard from Ed Ferry, thanking him for speaking to WEMA.

3/30/71,  Strongly negative editorial from the Stanford Daily

Another neutral newspaper clipping, paper unknown

Eleven letters to Packard in support of his speech nineteen letters against what he was saying.

Box 2, Folder 18 – Department of Defense

 

April 29, 1971, Conference on Domestic Action, Ft. McNair

It is not clear exactly what Domestic Action refers to, but judging from Packard’s comments it must have to do with people

.

4/29/71, Typewritten text of Packard’s talk – written in semi-outline format.

 

Packard thanks the audience for their “achievements over the past two years,” adding that their program has the strong support of both Secretary Laird and himself. “We have reports that many have done outstanding jobs in the many areas of domestic Action. Yet, it is also the nature of DA that much more can and should be done. I note that the main theme of this conference addresses what needs to be done.”

 

Packard says he would like to speak “informally” for a few minutes about two  :

points

 

“First,  despite all the debate you see in the press about the costs of our weapons systems and the size of our procurement accounts – by far the most costly resource in DOD is people.

 

“Second, DOD has been an active participant in the current reordering of national priorities, and these priorities have shifted to programs that emphasize people.

 

“People as a Resource”

 

“—In both military and civilian organizations the senior people by the nature of their work tend to become insulated from the problems of individuals. Must guard against this. All the effort within DOD to manage dollars, to improve technology, to make progress in attaining a peaceful world – all the effort depends on the people who make up DOD – men and women, civilian and military.

 

“—Effectiveness is not just efficiency. It includes the satisfaction one feels in doing his job. A great strength of the DAP is that people get a great deal of personal satisfaction in my being part of such an effort.

 

“—No one can be effective unless he had self respect and a sense of individual dignity. DOD efforts in equal opportunity are directed toward this.

 

Packard says that while the above points may be well understood, “What is not generally recognized is how much people cost and how fast these costs are going up.

 

 

“– Within DOD, pay and related costs have increased by $17.6 billion since FY 64, our pre-Vietnam base year. This is an increase of over 80%. Yet over the same period, defense manpower has decreased 3.5% In short, we are paying a great deal more for less people than we did eight years ago.

 

“– Another measure is that in 1964 43% of the defense dollar was for pay and related costs. It is now 52% — an increase of almost 10%. Put another way, over half our budget is for people.

 

“—When you return to your organization, it may be useful for you to point out just how much our manpower costs us. You can properly sell most Domestic Action projects on the proposition that they enable DOD to get better performance and effectiveness from each individual. Clearly, we must do this in a period of declining budgets and rising cost.

 

Reordering of National Priorities

 

“—This is a problem of communication and understanding. Few people appreciate the extent to which national priorities have been changed.

 

“—Critics of DOD talk about the need to stop the increase in Defense spending and the need to reduce defense programs.

 

“—These critics argue that defense is a source of funds for other Federal programs that are under-funded in the areas of education, health, housing, welfare, mass transit, the environment, and many others.

 

“—In fact, this reordering has already taken place and DOD has played a leading role.

“—The FY 72 Defense budget is 6.8% of GNP, the lowest since 1951. It is 32.1% of the total Federal budget, the lowest since 1950.

 

“—Our Defense budget for “72 is $76B which is 50% higher than for 1964. The non-

Defense portion of the budget for the same period is 230% higher. This says the non-Defense increase is four times that for defense.

 

“—My point is that we in DOD have actively supported and agreed with this change of emphasis in the Federal budget. Our first obligation, of course, is providing adequate security for this country, and in general we believe that this shift has gone about as far as it can.

 

“—The DOD DAP is additional evidence of our interest in increasing the emphasis on human values and goals. This audience is very familiar with the details of  that program. Truly, the DAP does get double duty for the dollars allocated to defense. This is an added increment to those parts of the non-Defense dollar devoted to human programs.

 

“Conclusion

 

“—This conference is one way of spreading the word that domestic action has the strong support of Secretary Laird and myself.

 

“—I wish you good luck in your conference.

 

“—I am sure that at next year’s conference each activity and department will report ‘We have done more.’

 

 

Box 2, Folder 19 – Department of Defense

 

May 19, 1971, Remarks at U. S. Investment Conference, Washington D. C.

 

5/19/71, Typewritten text of Packard’s remarks

 

Packard’s remarks are essentially a summary of the Department of Defense’s position on Vietnam  and the fiscal budget. His audience is apparently made up of investment analysts.

 

He says that “…our move into Cambodia for an essential, short, military operation may make it seem to the foreign observer that our policies and our aspirations have changed. They have not. On Vietnam we are anxious to keep the negotiations going.”

 

“North Vietnam has refused to negotiate on any basis short of allowing them to take over South Vietnam. That is why we are pursuing the alternate course we call Vietnamization. The sole purpose of the Cambodian operation is to accelerate the progress of Vietnamization.

 

“The world is in a period of rapid change and whatever changes come about on the world-wide scene will be influenced by attitudes inside the United States. If the American people seem to be too disunited to assume any international responsibility, there will be a vacuum of leadership that will encourage conflict in the international sphere. It is our hope that the United States can exercise leadership to bring about the change President Nixon envisioned when he said we must move from an era of confrontation to an era of negotiation. Unfortunately, here at home we seem to be going in the opposite direction.

 

“We believe it is time to bring more than two decades of confrontation during the cold war into a period of negotiation in which countries of the world can begin to devote to peaceful constructive ends at least some portion of the vast resources and energies which have formerly been devoted to increasing military power.”

 

Packard says that the Nixon administration policies have re-directed Federal resources from defense to non-defense programs.  He says “This has placed a stringent requirement on DOD to maintain strength of military forces at lower levels of expenditure” And he gives the numbers going from $78.7B in FY 1969 to $71.8B in FY 1971.

 

“One of the important objectives of this exercise is to apply more of the nation’s resources to domestic programs. The reallocation of financial resources is significant. The resulting reallocation of people will – already has – generated some serious problems.”

 

Packard says “…we are doing what we can in helping local communities.”  However he adds that “The Federal mechanism is not as effective as the market place in allocation of resources in the American economy.

 

“The skills of the aerospace industry cannot be quickly reorientated (sic). The impact on professionals, scientists, engineers, young graduates. Impact on scientific progress.”

 

“What does this mean for the investment community?

 

(1)  “DOD budget and therefore defense-related industries will be lower and will continue lower if we are indeed able to move the world scene from confrontation to negotiation.”

 

(2)  “The transition to lower defense spending will cause dislocations in economy and the transition will take time….These budget actions are a major reorientation of our priorities. This should be ample evidence that we mean what we say.”

 

(3)   “It is not a safe course for the United States or its free world allies to go very far in this direction unless the Communist countries are willing – by agreement or by their actions – to move ahead on a similar course.”

 

(4)  “If the domestic attitude of the U.S. does not respond, if this country refuses to accept its proper responsibility in international affairs, the results for the world could become drastic and traumatic – particularly for people who wish to maintain their freedom.”

 

 

Box 2, Folder 20 – Department of Defense

 

August 3, 1971, Speech at the Defense Management School, Fort Belvoir, VA

This was the opening day ceremony of the school and the audience consisted of representatives from each of the three military departments, staff, faculty, students and wives of DSMS, and selected persons including contractors who contributed to the establishment of the facility.

 

8/3/71, Typewritten text of Packard’s speech, with some handwritten notations by him.

 

Packard says it gives him “more than the usual pleasure to be with you here today for the opening of the Defense Systems Management School.” And he explains that the school “…had its origins two and a half years ago in the discussions and assessments we made as we sought ways to improve the management of our development and procurement programs.

 

“There was no doubt about the need for improvement. As we reviewed program after program –the F-111, the C-5A, the Mark 48, the MBT-70, the Cheyenne, and many more, it was almost impossible to find a major program that was not in trouble. All were behind schedule, although in most cases this was because impossible schedules had been set at the beginning of the program. All showed large cost growths and again, in many cases, this was because unrealistic cost targets had been set or because the Services had accepted “buy-ins” by the contractors. This was a shocking experience for me – case after case of just plain poor management by the largest department of the government and by well-known and large firms in the industry.

 

“The Congress and the public were critical of this gross mismanagement of this country’s resources and talent. And well they should have been.

 

“As we sought to discover reasons for this dismal performance and to find ways for improvement, several conclusions came to the surface. One conclusion was that if we wanted better management of these important programs, we must have better managers in charge. The so-called “system,” – the attitudes and practices that had been developed and were condoned over the years – had a great deal to do with the situation. But, given that all of the other factors could be corrected, it was clear to me that putting better managers in charge would do more to bring about improvement than anything else.

 

“And that is why we are here today. This Defense Systems Management School has been established for the specific purpose of making a substantial improvement in the capability and effectiveness of managers for the important development and production of the Department of Defense.

 

“We want this school to become the Academy of Management for the Department and for all four Services. We want it to be a school of high distinction where the best of modern management practices are taught. We want it to become a center of research for the improvement of managerial practices. We wanted it to be located in the Washington area where it can both have an influence on and be influenced by the high level people and policies of the department.

 

“Now, I have a special hope for this important new endeavor we are christening here today. I hope it will be a practical school for, after all, management is a practical profession. Management is getting things done – good management is getting things done right. That is what this school is for – to help us get things done right.

 

“Toward that end I have some specific suggestions for the policy guidance of this school. First, I want you to remember that the quality of any school is determined only by the quality of the faculty and the quality of its students.”

 

“As to the faculty,  I hope you will be able to attract and select the best people for your permanent staff I hope you will also bring in distinguished men from the ranks of public and private management for lectures, seminars and other activities which will expose your students to the best practices of good management throughout the country.

 

“As to your students, I hope you will establish high standards for admission. You should admit no student from any Service unless he is committed to a career in management. Today’s problems of defense management are just too large to be handled by the two-year wonder. These jobs can be done right only by men committed to a career in management I hope you will not waste your time, your energies, and your resources on any others.

 

“Don’t rely on computers to solve your management problems. Computers can’t think. What we need most of all is more good judgment. Plain common sense – the ability to make a good decision and stand up for it.

 

“I am pleased to note that you have assembled a fine faculty and a fine group of students for the opening session.”

 

“Finally, I want you to know that this Defense Systems Management School we are opening here today has the complete support of my office. I have high hopes for what you can accomplish with this new endeavor. I assure you that Secretary Laird and I consider this a very important step in the all important goal of giving this country more and better defense for the billions of dollars we have to spend.

 

“You are entering upon a new and an exciting and important journey here today. If you and those that follow you do your job well, you can make an enormous contribution to your country. You have my encouragement, my support, and my blessing.”

 

7/9/81, Letter to Packard from Brig. Gen. William E. Thurman, Defense Systems Management College, thanking Packard for speaking at their “Unveiling Ceremony.” The General says, “The day would not have been complete without you because of your efforts toward making the defense systems Management College what it is today. We speak of you often and use many of your thoughts with each class to establish the purpose of the College.,”

 

 

Box 2, Folder 21 – Department of Defense

 

August 11, 1971, Major Defense Systems Acquisition, DOD/NSIA Symposium,

Washington D. C.

 

8/11/71, Typewritten text of Packard’s speech.

 

Packard says he is pleased that this symposium is being held at this time. ”During these past two and a half years we have been giving this subject a great deal of attention as you know. We have made what I believe is a good start in delineating some new policies and procedures which will make it possible for the Department and the Services to work more effectively with the Industry. I believe these new policies and procedures will enable the government to obtain more and better equipment for the billions of dollars of the taxpayers’ money that are being spent. I believe also these new policies can result in a stronger, healthier defense-related industry in the future.”

 

Packard says there will be continuing pressures on the defense budget and funds available for defense systems and equipment will be limited. This limitation, he says, is the result of a general anti-defense attitude in the country, and large cost over-runs by the Services and by industry. “There is no way to avoid this criticism except to do a better job in the future.

 

“When a system ends costing twice as much as the original contract target, as did the C-5A for example, there is no explanation but to admit it was bad management….The only answer is to find a way to do these jobs right and I presume that is why we are here today.”

 

Proceeding to outline some new policies and procedures, Packard says that “The first step for a successful Major Defense Systems Acquisition is to make the right decisions in the beginning. To do this is not a simple matter.” He goes over some examples of reasons this decision can be difficult.

 

Saying that “We are doing a number of things which we believe will enable better decisions to be made at the beginning of a major program,” he gives some specifics.

 

“First, we in the Department of Defense are going to better describe and understand what we want and need. As a part of this you can expect us to focus more on effectiveness and less on platforms. For example, in many cases it is just very much more efficient and practical to double the capability of weapons than it is to double the number of platforms to deliver the present weapons. Secondly, we are taking a broader perspective on what we already have and what we might need….We first describe what we want to be able to do within … functional areas, look at what we already have, and then identify what needs to be done.”

 

“We want to keep programs in Advanced Development longer, until we are sure we know what we are doing. We want to put more reliance on hardware and less on paper studies in Advanced Development.”

 

“…As an example, the AX program is based upon competitive prototypes that will be built and tested before we approve this system for procurement or select a contractor. In the case of the B-1, there will be a prototype before we approve this system for acquisition. The HARPOON missile will be expensively tested and developed in preproduction form before production is approved.”

 

“As I reviewed program after program beginning in the spring of 1969, almost all were in trouble from a common fault – production had been started before engineering development was finished. I am sure you all know all about this problem. Several important policies and procedures have been established to help avoid the disastrous results of concurrency:

 

1. “We will not use total package procurement contracts on major programs;

 

1. “In general, major development contracts will be cost-incentive type with performance milestones rather than calendar milestones, and will require close working relationships between Service managers and Industry managers;

 

1. “Fixed-price production contracts will be negotiated on major programs after the development has proceeded far enough that we know what we are to produce, and we know it will work the way we want it to work.

 

“Again, we have established procedures to assure that programs are in fact set up the way they should be – that appropriate milestones of performance are established and are met before the program moves ahead.

 

“What we are proposing is very simple – these major acquisition programs will turn out better only if they are managed better. There is no better way to improve the management of a program than to get a better manager and give him the responsibility and authority to manage, We are making some progress in this direction. All of the Services have accepted the need to select better people for program management.

 

“We opened a new school last week at Fort Belvoir to improve management training. We have made some progress to clarify and improve the authority of the project manager. We have not yet gone as far as we need to go. The decision making process on many programs is still too much of a committee process in most of the Services. Worse than that, the members of the committees that make the decisions often know very little about the project except what they have been told and the decisions are often driven by the wrong considerations. There is, however, already considerable improvement.

 

“Two and a half years ago we had only a few programs that were going the way they should. Often I would go to a briefing on the status of a project and was completely disgusted with what I heard. Last week I was briefed on the status of four projects by one of the Services and I came away very proud of the way these projects were being managed.

 

‘There is, then, some hope we can, working together – the Services, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Industry – do this job of “Major Defense Systems Acquisition  the way this country should expect us to do it. I hope we will gain a better understanding of how to do the job the way it should be done. I wish to emphasize that better management of these important programs is a responsibility above the parochial interests of the Services and above the selfish interests of the Industry. This would be a big challenge in times of rising budgets and enthusiasm for defense – it is an even greater challenge for us in the environment of this decade of the 1970s.”

 

8/11/71, Copy of DOD News Release with full text of Packard’s speech

 

 

Box 2, Folder 22 – Department of Defense

 

September 10, 1971, Federal Bar Association, New Orleans, LA

 

9/10/71, Typewritten text of Packard’s speech

 

“Today,” Packard says, “The rate of change in both domestic and foreign affairs perhaps exceeds any previously experienced. Our problem today is to guide and fashion these forces of change with wisdom and patience so that change is accomplished in a peaceful and orderly way. I believe the President’s programs – foreign and domestic – provide the basis for bringing about change in such a way that we can and we will move away from war and violence and toward lasting peace.

 

“It is our job in the Defense Department to provide the military strength adequate to support the President’s foreign policy for the decade of the 1970s.” And Packard refers to other priorities of the Defense Department. “We have substantially reduced the defense share of the Federal budget to enable the nation to devote more resources to the attainment of non-defense goals. But we believe that, without adequate national security strength, all these other goals in fields of domestic policy would be placed in jeopardy.

 

“We have reoriented our national defense programs in keeping with the Nixon Doctrine and our supporting National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence. In the process we have made significant reductions in the levels of our military forces.. In achieving these results, the greatly scale of our Vietnam involvement has been a major accomplishment. This and other reductions have made it possible to cut the cost of our defense forces from 9.5% of the Gross national Product in FY 1968 to only 6.8% in FY 1972.”

 

“We have now gone as far as we safely can go in reducing the defense budget. Further reductions in the defense budget below the present level could be very dangerous to our position of world leadership in the decade ahead.”

 

“In 1964 the United States had a significant superiority in strategic nuclear forces over the Soviet Union. The Peoples Republic of China had no nuclear forces.

 

“Today, the situation is vastly different. The Soviets not only have larger land-based inter-continental missiles than we, they have about 40% more of such weapons than we have. Their submarine-based nuclear force is growing by leaps and bounds and will be equal in size to ours in two or three years. In other aspects as well, their nuclear forces have been rapidly expanded since 1964.

 

“The result of this Soviet buildup is that now the Soviet Union stands on a par with us in overall offensive strategic power and surpasses us in defensive strategic weapons systems. The Peoples Republic of China also has tested nuclear weapons and missiles, and could, therefore, have in this decade a strategic force capable of threatening our friends and allies in Asia and perhaps even the U. S.

 

“Hopefully, we may, by careful negotiations with the Soviets, be able eventually to reduce the level of destructive nuclear power possessed by both sides to a lower level. But I believe we cannot and must not, under any circumstances, make unilateral reductions in the already-restrained levels of our nuclear forces, as some recommend.”

 

“Even with an agreement – which might be reached in the near future – I do not anticipate that there could be a significant and immediate reduction in the Defense Budget, particularly in view of rising manpower costs as we move toward an all-volunteer force.

 

“Another area of concern is Naval Forces. This is so because of the large Soviet Naval buildup since 1964. In that year, we had a decisive superiority in every class of combat ship in both numbers and capability except for non-nuclear submarines. During the past few years the Soviets have greatly expanded their naval forces, and now they can challenge our Navy in the Mediterranean and elsewhere, sending impressive naval task forces throughout the world’s oceans.

 

“Our planning for the future must include funds to strengthen our Navy, and it does.”

 

“…the national strength we need to give enlightened leadership to this troubled world is more…than just military strength. It includes our moral strength and our economic strength. This was explicitly taken into account when we framed our National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence. This strategy is embodied in our new Total force concept which seeks to utilize all appropriate resources for deterrence  — U.S. and the free world – in order to capitalize best on all available assets. Moral and economic strength are part and parcel of the overall strength necessary for this country to exercise its role in world affairs and to work in pursuit of President Nixon’s goal of achieving a generation of peace.”

 

“We need strength and moral fiber at home in order to succeed abroad. A nation that is weak internally and timid in spirit, cannot provide stabilizing leadership in international affairs.”

 

“I deplore any attitude that says – let Washington solve all problems. I have been in government long enough to know that Washington alone simply cannot do it.

 

“I believe it is very important that we arrest any attitude of increasing dependence on Washington. We must instead reemphasize our proven traditional concept that individuals working together in every part of this country – South, North, East and West – have the brains and energy to solve most of the problems that affect their daily lives.”

 

“Individual responsibility, decentralization of political power, and voluntary action in a pluralistic society are sources of American national strength. And there are other sources of our national strength to be protected and cultivated – free speech, full, open and enlightened debate on national policies, and a system of impartial justice based on law.

 

“Differences of opinion on the domestic front are not evidence of weakness. It is the nature of a democracy that we encourage a free exchange of ideas and must have constructive and peaceful dissent. But how dissent is expressed is important. Dissent expressed in violence is anarchy, not democracy. Democracy requires that we recognize one another’s rights. Violence is the antithesis of reasoned dissent and a denial of the rights of others.

 

“I need not explain to this audience that free debate, the rule of law, and the integrity of the process of law enforcement are essential ingredients of our national strength. Nor need I remind you of your obligation as members of the bar to uphold these things. It may be true that some countries can be at least temporarily strong without these things – but not the United States.”

 

“These historic principles need not, and do not, block needed change. On the contrary, they facilitate change. In my experience both prior to and within the Department of Defense, I have found that rational discussion among reasonable men can lead to change on both sides. We seek the opportunity to talk with those interested in change.”

 

“The Federal government must serve all of the people all of the time. It cannot yield to violence and disruption by a militant minority. And, your government – and the great majority of the American people – are determined that threats to bring the people’s government to a halt will not be permitted to succeed.

 

“In summary, I believe that we must emphasize a sense of responsibility in our deliberations and in our debates and actions to bring about change. This administration is taking steps to move toward peace and justice in a responsible fashion.”

 

Packard says despite the troubled times he is encouraged by the progress made over the past two and a half years.

 

“On the international front, we are well on our way to ending American military involvement in Vietnam without abandoning our friends in that part of the world. We are talking to the Soviet Union about strategic arms limitations, but we remain firm against precipitous, unilateral reductions. Navy Under Secretary John Warner will begin important talks with the Soviets next month on items of mutual interest to the two leading sea powers. There has been some hopeful progress recently on Berlin, and the President has reopened communications with the Peoples Republic of China.

 

“On the domestic front, I see signs of progress in drug control, in race relations, in reducing poverty and suffering, in educational opportunities, in controlling pollution, in fighting crime and toward new economic prosperity.

 

“I particularly applaud the President’s recent moves on the economic front. I believe these actions clearly recognize the fundamental problems underlying the serious inflationary pressures as well as the changing pattern of world economics.

 

“We may not reach the millenium in the 1970s but I believe we are off to a good start. I am confident that your organization, under the leadership of Normand Poirier and Dick Kleindienst, will continue to make a great contribution to the preservation of the vitality of our democracy – preservation of the vitality of our democracy – preservation of a national environment of excellence in which each individual can make his and here contribution to progress to prosperity and to peace for the next generation and beyond.”

 

9/10/71, Press Release from Department of Defense with full text of Packard’s speech

9/10/71, Copy of the program of the Federal Bar Association Annual Convention

9/10/71, Typewritten copy of speech given at this Convention by John Warner Director , Ocean Affairs – amended by hand written notations.

7/20/71, Letter to Margaret Paull (Packard’s Secretary) from Elaine Crane Assistant to Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst talking about details of the banquet at the Convention.

8/20/71, Letter to Packard from Marshall Gardner , The Federal Bar Association, discussing details of Packard’s trip to New Orleans.

9/9/71, Memorandum from Col. James Boatner giving itinerary for Packard’s trip to New Orleans.

 

 

Box 2, Folder 23 – Department of Defense

 

November 4, 1971, Meeting With Newsmen

 

11/4/71, Typewritten transcription of question and answer session Packard had with newsmen.

 

Packard starts by introducing Dr. Albert C. Hall who, he explains, will be the new Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. Packard goes on to discuss the intelligence field and what he has in mind for this job.

 

“Let me go back now and talk about intelligence in general terms, and in terms of the three areas that we sometimes think about, which is national intelligence, tactical intelligence, and technical intelligence. National intelligence is that information and its interpretation that is needed by the President, his Cabinet, the Secretary and other officials to make important decisions.”

 

“Tactical intelligence, I think, is just about self-explanatory. That’s what the field commander needs to command his forces and this is, of course, a very critical matter because the extent to which he knows what the enemy is going to do, he’s in a position then to command his forces in a more effective way.

 

“…as we address the question of what kind of new weapons we should develop, it’s very important that we have some understanding about the characteristics of the enemy weapons because we are anxious to either have superior weapons, weapons that will be able to counter whatever the enemy capability may be.”

 

In response to questions as to the specific nature of Dr. Hall’s position Packard says he (Dr. hall) will be coordinating the budget control of the intelligence operations, but will not be supervising the operations themselves.

 

Another question asks about two complaints; one, that with each Service and the CIA “doing their own thing” there is no direct civilian control, and two, with all the “mountains” of data collected whoever gets time to read it all?

 

In answer to the first question Packard says “…our problem [in gathering all types of intelligence] is not to say there can be only one intelligence activity because the issue is just too complex, but to try to be sure that we bring all of these into focus….We will be looking at those issues – the balance between technical, tactical and national intelligence and the balance between those people who are involved in those areas, [is] going to be a very important part of [Dr. Hall’s] job.

 

“On the use of resources, this again is an issue and as I’ve intimated you have two problems in intelligence. One is to collect all the information that’s available and the second is to be able to understand what that information means. We have already spent some time in addressing this matter of balance between how much information we’re collecting and our ability to utilize it effectively, and that again will be something that will be continually addressed.”

 

Q: The questioner says he understands there are 140,000 people or so on the Defense Department payroll involved in intelligence. And he asks if this number will be cut.

 

A: Packard says “I couldn’t give you any judgment about what reductions, if any, can be made. I’m confident from what I know about it that we can do a more efficient job of managing these resources, but I just can’t give you any specific predictions nor even a very good calibration point that I can confirm to you today.”

 

Q: “Again, without centralized authority, Mr. Secretary, what can you do about the problem of redundancy?”

 

A: “The way you worry about the redundancy of functions is to be able to examine what this group is doing and to be able to do that in relation to what some other group is doing If you find there are duplications that are not appropriate, you can make the necessary changes. I think one way to consider these staff jobs, and this applies not only to intelligence but to other jobs, one of the responsibilities is to make sure that there’s not unnecessary duplication and second to assure that we’re not leaving something out, and this applies to DDR&E and other people as well as this function.

 

Q: “Let me raise another criticism and see what your answer will be. The criticism would be that a businessman’s approach to intelligence is the wrong technique and the wrong place. Intelligence by its nature has to be inefficient, has to be redundant, and that to use normal business efficiency methods is going to deprive you of some opposing intelligence views from the field.”

 

A: “I think that’s perhaps an oversimplification, but there is something to that, and it relates to the sort of thing I talked about in national intelligence. It’s impossible to have one crystal ball that’s going to be perfect, and I’m not at all troubled with maybe having two separate groups involved in certain of these things simply because you have no assurance that one group is going to do it right and maybe have a little competition is a helpful thing, so I don’t think you just go through this and say there can be no duplication.

 

Q: A questioner asks about foreign aid.

 

A: ”I’d be very glad to say a word about foreign aid. As a good many of you know, I’ve been working very closely in this foreign affairs area since I came out here. I started out working closely with Dr. Kissinger, the NSC, and doing some of the analysis that resulted in the backup for the Nixon Doctrine; the decision that we would move toward more reliance on our friends and allies, that we would move from an era of confrontation into an era of negotiation has been something that I’ve been very much interested in and very close to. I think that most of you know probably that I have supported the President very strongly, even in the Cambodian incident, and so I’m fully and enthusiastically behind the things that the President has been doing these past 2 ½ years and I’ve been frankly very pleased to have had some part in working with the White House and the President in supporting this program.

 

“To me, the Senate action last Friday was an absolute disaster. Here at the time when we’re trying to move into a new and, I think, very important inter-national posture where the President has moved out into some areas which I see as beginning a new era in the United States relationship with the rest of the world, not only the Free World but the entire world, and for at this time the Senate to undercut this whole program by voting against foreign aid, by turning down the foreign aid bill, is just about the worst thing that could have happened.

 

“The thing that troubles me in particular is that I don’t believe that a good many of the Senators who were involved in this really understand what a serious blow they’ve given to this matter.”

 

“The trouble with the situation is that the damage has been done, and the confidence that our friends and allies and other people around the world can have in what we will do in the future to support them and to work with them has been seriously undercut by this Senate action. It will help if the full foreign aid request of the President is reinstated, either through a continuing resolution—and this as you know will have to be done before the 15^th of this month because that’s when the present continuing resolution runs out – or by a substantial reinstatement of the original request, I think any piecemeal program that cuts in any substantive way to military assistance or economic assistance will just confirm the fears that have been generated by this action.”

 

Q: The questioner says that critics say it is meaningless to “shower” arms on a country if the population is not behind the local government; and asks why that won’t happen in Cambodia.

 

A: “I just can assure you that we’ve learned a lesson. We’re not going to get involved in Cambodia. We have a very low presence there, but at the same time the Cambodians are very anxious to defend their country and the thing that everybody forgets is there’s one way for this war to end in a hurry and that’s just for the North Vietnamese to go home.

 

Q: A questioner asks if there is a direct link between the cutoff of aid and withdrawal of troops from South Vietnam.

 

A: The answer is no, and I would not want to comment about the withdrawal of troops. As you know, the President is going to make an announcement here in a couple of weeks and I think we’ll just wait and see what he says about that matter.

 

Q: Mr. Secretary, it’s not clear to me whether you’re saying this is a disaster no matter what happens from now on or whether you think there’s some way to save the chestnut and that’s to back out of the fire.

 

A: “What I’m saying is that I think a significant amount of damage has been done almost no matter what happens.”

 

Q: “Secretary Packard, are you just inferring that our allies are going to lose confidence or do you have specific concerns from certain countries?

 

A: I can’t fill in specific details today, but we’ve had specific concerns from a great many very important people.

 

Q: I wonder as you survey the legislative wreckage, and you said that you did not anticipate the shellacking you got in the senate, and it’s been pretty clear that Senator Symington and others on the Hill don’t trust the Pentagon and what it’s doing in these foreign countries before you’re not giving them an adequate amount of information, and yesterday we went around about how tight your ISA is about telling what it’s doing in the world and what the military loans are doing, and they won’t even admit when you call them and say what are you doing about this aerospace plan in Greece, and we could go on and on. My question is, have you perhaps thought about reassessing what you do say publicly to try and explain what this military aid is all about and what you’re trying to do and what concessionary loans are and what they’re buying with them and where they’re going. I think you have a credibility gap.

 

A: I don’t want to answer those specific questions, but I’m quite willing to admit that we’ve failed to get the story over. As I said, I’ve been working in this issue very closely. I’ve been very enthusiastic about it. I think it’s the right way to go and somehow we haven’t gotten the story over. What we can do to improve in the future I’m sure we will give some consideration to. I can’t talk about specific actions.

 

 

Box 2, Folder 24 – Department of Defense

 

November 21, 1971, Society of Medical consultants to the Armed Forces

 

11/21/71, Ten 3×5 inch cards upon which Packard wrote an outline of his comments.

 

Thanks for 26 years of important contributions

 

Medical practice and medical research are important to Services.

 

Acknowledge Dr. Richard Wilbut

 

This has been an interesting and busy three years for Department – much criticism’ but satisfying progress

 

Changes in organization and management philosophy

 

Re-ordering of priorities:  DOD budget 9.5% if GNP to 6.8%

 

Development of Foreign Policy for the decade of 1970s

 

President Nixon has made a historic transition from an era of confrontation into an era of negotiation

 

Post WW II Foreign Policy – Dominant military, dominant economic

 

Containment of Communism NATO, CENTO, SEATO, DOREA, JAPAN

 

The world has changed from period which spawned this policy

 

Soviet military strength, economy growth – Europe, Japan, also Korea, Thailand, Taipei

 

Split in Communist Block – competition between free world remains but war between major powers is not attractive…Negotiation, Strength, Partnership

 

Vietnam – Most influential

 

Indo China – key to stabilization of SEA

Korea, Japan

 

NATO – U. S. Must remain

 

Mid-East, South Asia and Indian Ocean

 

Negotiation – Salt, Berlin, MBFR, Mid-East

 

Foreign Aid essential

 

Moral of friends essential

 

World relations are going through major changes

 

President Nixon has shown great leadership – he needs our support

 

11/3/71, Letter to Packard from Bernard Pisani, M.D., society of Medical Consultants to the Armed Forces, discussing details of their Meeting

Undated, Typewritten draft of outline “for possible remarks to Society of Medical Consultants to the Armed Forces.” Source not clear.